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Abstract. The paper has been written from a philosophical perspective and triggered 
by the recurrent discussions in psychology about the most suitable methods to study 
our multifaceted subjectivity. Its main point is that a phenomenological understan-
ding of the human person provides a robust and also flexible philosophical frame-
work for psychology. The first part discusses three classical distinctions – individu-
al/general; explaining/understanding; induction/interpretation– which, in spite of 
possible deficiencies, are useful to illustrate the specificity of the human sciences 
relative to the natural sciences. If not understood as an either-or dichotomy these 
distinctions represent the search of the right balance to reflect the complexity and 
richness of psychological science. The second part presents the phenomenologi-
cal notions of ‘vital reduction’ and ‘personalist reduction’, where reductions does 
not take on an eliminativistic meaning, but of directing the mind’s gaze to attend to 
what is originally the case. The ‘vital reduction’ reveals a subject of experience at 
the center of the lifeworld, and the ‘personalist reduction’ sees in rationality – i.e., 
the power to grasp the meaning of things and to recognize other subjects of expe-
rience – a deeper dimension of the subject, who we can thus call a person. Psycho-
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logy and phenomenology converge in disclosing the person-centeredness of our li-
feworld.
Keywords: psychology; personalism; phenomenology; personalist reduction; huma-
nistic psychology; hermeneutics.
The present paper has been written from a philosophical perspective and 
triggered by the recurrent discussions in psychology about the most suit-
able methods to study our multifaceted subjectivity. Its main point is that 
a phenomenological understanding of the human person provides a ro-
bust and also flexible philosophical framework for psychology. Its goal 
is not to suggest novel methods for psychology, nor is it to pursue a the-
oretical integration of multiple levels of analysis –  cognitive, genetic, 
developmental, evolutionary, social, etc.– in the manner of an integra-
tive pluralism (Kendler 2005; Lilienfeld 2007; Healy 2012). Its concern is 
more inter- or cross-disciplinary, than intra-disciplinary. Phenomenolo-
gy as a philosophical school is a serious effort to be as faithful as possible 
to reality as given to our consciousness, and to bring to light the nature 
of consciousness itself. It has attracted psychology since its beginnings 
(Spiegelberg 1972), and phenomenological methods in qualitative psy-
chology are a remarkable example of how psychology and phenomenol-
ogy can work together (Englander 2016). This article, however, just calls 
for a more fruitful conceptual framework to make sense of the various 
methods in psychology.
The first part brings attention to three well-known pairs of notions: 
individual/general; explaining/understanding; induction/interpretation. 
In spite of their inadequacies, they are useful to illustrate the specific-
ity of the human sciences relative to the natural sciences, or so I  sug-
gest. I then present a distinction within the phenomenological tradition 
that provides two significant bridge-concepts for a fruitful dialogue be-
tween philosophy and the scientific study of the human person: ‘vital re-
duction’ and ‘personalist reduction’ (Leocata 2007; 2010). As will become 
clear, the meaning of the term ‘reduction’ in phenomenology is oppo-
site to any sort of eliminativism and may therefore appear unfortunate 
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in this context. ‘Reduction’ in phenomenology aims at revealing a prin-
ciple that informs and gives sense to our experience and behavior, with-
out undercutting any other elements or dimensions involved. The sense 
of the ‘vital reduction’ is to reveal a subject of experience at the center of 
the lifeworld, of the world as it is lived. The ‘personalist reduction’ sees 
in rationality – i.e., the power to grasp the meaning of things and to rec-
ognize other subjects of experience – a deeper dimension in the subject. 
Psychology and phenomenology converge therefore in disclosing the per-
son-centeredness of the world, an insight that is far from any form of sub-
jectivism, as I hope will become clear in the second part.
1. The methodological and theoretical richness of psychological 
science
Although mental life is partially dependent on physical and biological 
phenomena, the study of subjectivity is not limited to the natural sci-
ences. Neuroscientists, for example, assume an understanding of men-
tal life and behavior to interpret electrograms and brain scans. These 
outputs do not provide them with criteria for interpreting that informa-
tion but uncover some conditions and causes of the enactment, varia-
tions, and distortions of mental life and behavior. From a scientific per-
spective Krakauer et al. (2017) argue compellingly for behavioral research 
as a guiding vision for neuroscientific studies. The same applies to the 
formal sciences, increasingly engaged in the investigation of the natu-
ral world. It is one thing to say that complex nonlinear models are better 
suited to represent and formalize human behavior than more basic math-
ematical tools, and a very different one to claim that we would have thus 
achieved a sufficient explanation.
Relative to the neurosciences, psychology is much better placed as 
a scientific counterpart in a comprehensive study of the human person 
(Smith 2021). First, psychology deals with thoughts, beliefs and behavior 
without further justification; that is just its field. Second, psychology is 
also close to other kinds of empirical study, mainly to neurobiology and 
the social sciences. The social sciences, dealing with our cultural, social 
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and intersubjective dimensions, are just as relevant as brain sciences to 
understanding mental life. Without yielding neither to neurobiological 
reductionism nor to social constructivism, however, the focus of psychol-
ogy remains individual experience and subjectivity (Kirschner 2015).
In a recent contribution Danks and Eberhardt highlight the method-
ological strain in experimental psychology as a consequence of the pre-
tense to be a natural science. They claim that psychological phenomena 
are relatively inaccessible, and mental states are not directly observable; 
hence we measure proxies, like behavior and reports. The authors observe 
that while it is accepted that individual differences make psychological 
data highly variable, the obvious fact that the data “come from inten-
tional agents with their own desires, beliefs, etc.” (Danks and Eberhardt 
2019, 215) should be discussed more. Now, subjects themselves are often 
unaware of these differences. We therefore use various techniques to ex-
plore unconscious cognition, preferring behavioral to verbal measures, 
and this increases the interpretive load of psychological theories. With-
out yielding to pessimism, the authors soberly conclude that no experi-
mental design is perfect.
Writing for the same volume Bechtel and Wright (2019) concentrate 
on two kinds of psychological explanation: nomological and mechanistic. 
What psychology often calls effects – the Garcia effect, the pratfall effect, 
etc.– relate stimuli with experiences and behavior, but remain at a de-
scriptive level, leaving the question ‘why?’ unanswered. However, a  lot 
of research today concentrates on what are called psychological mech-
anisms, trying to identify both the mental operations and the relevant 
brain parts involved in psychological phenomena. Mechanisms are rep-
resented as models and simulations with graphic displays, which provide 
a better understanding than propositional thinking or mathematical for-
mulations and also help to account for individual cases, a central purpose 
of psychological science.
The two mentioned contributions prompt to reconsider psychology’s 
peculiar position at a disciplinary crossroads and as the study of the per-
son as a subject of experience. Both contribute to a greater awareness of 
the limitations of the methods used in the natural sciences for psychol-
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ogy, whose object is undoubtedly far more complex. The classical distinc-
tions discussed below are not understood as an either-or dichotomy but 
represent the search of the right balance to reflect the complexity and 
richness of psychological science. Stressing one member of the distinc-
tion qualifies the extent and purpose of the other member and does not 
entail its rejection; roughly speaking, the reverse is true in the natural 
sciences. For a more extended treatment see (Leocata 2010, 167–203).
The first distinction is the renowned one between the individual and 
the general. It reminds of Wilhelm Windelband’s description of the sci-
ences of the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften), mainly historical sciences, as 
ideographic – literally: depicting the individual–, and of the natural sci-
ences (Naturwissenschaften) as nomothetic – literally: establishing laws–. 
Influenced by contemporary psychological research carried out by figures 
such as Wundt, Weber and Fechner, Windelband himself placed psychol-
ogy within the natural sciences, whereas history would represent the par-
adigm of a Geisteswissenchaft (Windelband 1894). However imprecise and 
disputable, such characterization reflects the prevalent focus at the time. 
The natural sciences study numerous individual objects (the planet Earth, 
the atmosphere, a pack of wolves, evolution, etc.), but they do so under the 
light of regularities obeyed in specific circumstances, revealed by obser-
vation and experience. Their individuality is still mostly an instantiation 
of a general pattern or set of laws. In turn, the sciences of the spirit also 
seek regularities, comparing cases and patterns of behavior or develop-
ment in different individual persons and groups of people, but with the 
aim of making better sense of particular cases. Whereas exceptions and 
irregularities reveal insufficient information for the sake of formulating 
laws of nature, they are expected and regarded as customary in the human 
sciences, because the individual counts for them as such, in a way no nat-
ural scientist would admit. The study of the mechanisms of sense percep-
tion and other mental operations closely dependent upon physical prop-
erties is only a fraction of empirical psychology. We should therefore not 
expect the same kind of predictability in both kinds of sciences.
The second pair of notions is closely connected, and we owe it to an-
other German philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey, who used it with the same 
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purpose as Windelband’s. Following up on a distinction drawn by Johann 
Gustav Droysen, Dilthey did not focus on the kind of object, but on the 
kind of attitude scientists should approach their object with, and on the 
expected result in each kind of science. He proposed that the goal of the 
natural sciences is to explain (erklären), whereas human sciences seek to 
understand (verstehen), borrowing the latter term from the hermeneuti-
cal tradition starting from Schleiermacher (Von Wright 1971; Gantt and 
Williams 2016). In ordinary speech to explain and to understand are used 
almost as synonyms, but a finer analysis suggests a relevant nuance. To 
explain means to be able to identify the laws and causes that account for 
something, for its properties, reactions, etc., and even though determin-
ism does not necessarily reign in the natural world, the verification that 
things with the same properties behave and react identically under the 
same circumstances, marks the path of progress for natural science. On 
the contrary, intentionality, motivation, and free will, without which we 
cannot make sense of the lived world of an individual person or of a group 
of people, are object of understanding. They are also causes, having vis-
ible effects in the world and in our behavior – often more than other caus-
es– but they are causes of a different nature.
Just as the first distinction, this second one loses its relevance for 
the human sciences if understood as an either-or dichotomy. The why 
to which natural and human scientists seek an answer is different, but 
both look for regularities. Individuals and groups enjoy a reasonably large 
degree of autonomy, but they also tend to behave in partly predictable 
ways. Information about a wide variety of human situations, including 
past ones, and using quantitative methods and statistics, unquestionably 
contributes to a better knowledge of humanity. So, if explaining without 
understanding tends to ignore subjectivity, for an understanding blind 
to the search of regularities things can easily become arbitrary and ulti-
mately also unintelligible. To put it in different terms, it is erroneous to 
see particular human situations as just examples of established laws, be-
cause some elements that need to be factored in the equation to account 
for them, such as motivation and intentionality, are only understandable 
as sense-making of those situations.
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The third distinction probably captures the specificity of the natural 
sciences more sharply. Since Bacon, Descartes and Galileo, modern sci-
ence is built on induction as a process of generalization from observation 
and experience with the purpose of establishing laws, which describe the 
phenomena and open the way to new discoveries. Even though the natu-
ral sciences adopted induction first, there is no reason why it should not 
be useful for the human sciences as well. The difference between both 
kinds of sciences, therefore, lies not in induction as such but in how to 
understand the facts and terms involved.
In the human sciences establishing general tendencies and probabili-
ties, from an inductive base as large as possible and from comparisons be-
tween cases, does not dispense with the interpretation of individual cas-
es. Such an effort is necessary because actions and experiences acquire 
meaning within a personal context, where a perspective of the world is 
at play. Culture, beliefs, values, expectations, preferences are not simply 
facts that could be ‘verified’ like physical properties. And engaging with 
a constellation of meanings in order to capture a personal world requires 
an empathic relationship, which involves a double hermeneutic circle. On 
the one hand, each part or aspect of a person’s world reflects to some ex-
tent the whole of that world and is rightly understood within it. So, the 
whole makes the parts more intelligible, and the parts clearly contribute 
to understanding the personal world as a whole. On the other hand, the 
unity of a world of meanings is given in and by each subject or person, 
who does not exist independently of that context. Although there always 
remains a certain ineffability to each person, understanding the context 
contributes to understanding the person, and vice versa.
The fruitful dialectic tension within these three methodological dis-
tinctions is reflected in the mutual complementarity of qualitative and 
quantitative methods in psychological science (Todd et al. 2004). Quan-
titative studies focus on one particular hypothesis, tested in the largest 
possible number of cases. Statistical methods and probabilities are used 
to arrive at general conclusions, which provide precise answers to specif-
ic questions. But they are not good at generating new hypotheses, nor do 
they provide any information regarding what it feels like to be in a given 
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situation. The exploratory character of qualitative research recommends 
it instead for both purposes. By observing individuals and groups, or by 
conducting interviews with open-ended questions, it aims to capture the 
richness of human experience and to detect relevant nuances and differ-
ences, as well as commonalities. It provides descriptions of lived experi-
ence and behavior and is therefore able to suggest hypotheses for later 
quantitative research. The result is typically a narrative using labels to 
describe how subjects convey their experience and quoting their actu-
al words when relevant. The narrative is mostly interpretative and takes 
recourse to a wide variety of theoretical elements. This circularity be-
tween data and theory, and the greater involvement of participants, con-
vey qualitative research a highly dynamic character. Data gathered us-
ing qualitative methods can also be analyzed quantitatively, establishing 
recurrences, correlations, etc. Many researchers understandably prefer 
mixed methods, combining the advantages of both.
The methodology of psychological inquiry is multifaceted, because 
such is human psychology. The relatively simple regularities, or effects, 
and mechanisms that describe psychological phenomena, on the one 
hand, and the subtleties of individual interpretations of a person’s world, 
on the other hand, suggest that a rich conceptual spectrum is necessary 
to make sense of our subjectivity. We are placed at multiple crossroads, 
and all of them are reflected in our psychology: we think, behave and act 
as embodied beings; we live embedded in a multi-layered social and cul-
tural context; we have a more or less conscious worldview and uphold 
more or less strict ethical values. Biological and social factors are imbri-
cated in our constitution, but without anchoring psychology in the indi-
vidual person psychological claims may sound abstract or denaturalized. 
How are we to understand this interwovenness of all dimensions of the 
human person? In the following section I suggest some phenomenologi-
cal clarifications that can contribute to delineating the intersection be-
tween philosophy and psychological science.
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2. A theoretical contribution from phenomenology
The term ‘reduction’ is definitely ambiguous in this context. A theory 
is said to be reducible when its laws can be understood as cases of more 
general laws. The project of naturalizing consciousness is based on this 
reductionist assumption insofar it rejects any explanation of conscious-
ness that is not amenable to the natural or the formal sciences (Petitot et 
al. 1999). A stronger meaning of reduction is found in the eliminativistic 
claim that there is only one basic constituent of reality, most likely mat-
ter (Lombardi 2017).
In phenomenology, however, reduction has a  completely different 
meaning and actually serves the opposite purpose. It means something 
like ‘conducing’, referring or directing the mind’s gaze to attend to what 
is originally the case but probably not noticed in the first experience of 
an event. When speaking with somebody we pay attention to what is said, 
to the environment where we are having the conversation, to the span 
of time the conversation lasted, to the person we are talking to, etc.; in 
sum, we focus on the world and on what happens in the world. In Husserl’s 
terms, ordinary life is carried on with a ‘natural attitude’ regarding things 
and people. But after that conversation we could adopt a different attitude 
and focus instead on our own experience: if we could see and hear the per-
son well, what inner reactions we had during the conversation, whether it 
seemed brief or rather long to us, etc. All of this is no less certain than the 
previous consideration but was not necessarily apparent during the con-
versation. It reveals a new sphere of meaning, which is not perceived the 
same way as the ‘objective’ world. The world is given to us in and through 
that ‘subjective’ mediation, not as a brute fact but under some perspective, 
with some kind of participation of our own.
The scope of this different approach, the ‘phenomenological attitude’, 
ranges from the basic awareness that although we were listening to a per-
son, listening is an act of ours – not what or whom we were listening to– 
to realizing that we would have experienced the same conversation in 
a different way under other circumstances, had we been less tired, more 
relaxed or cheerful, for example, or had we entered the conversation with 
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different expectations or purposes. This reduction discloses a  range of 
acts, attitudes, moods, which are a condition for our involvement in and 
with the world. Husserl called it a phenomenological reduction, meaning 
that we are thus led – conduced– to discover the reality and the struc-
ture of conscious or mental life. Mental life has in fact a peculiar kind of 
consistency to itself and even an apodictic character, because it is imme-
diately given. Although our attention is first directed to the world, the 
world appears to us unescapably through some subjective mediation, also 
partly depending on our bodily condition: things are given in space from 
a certain perspective; sensations depend upon our bodily constitution; 
the structure of time inextricably knits memory, attention and expecta-
tion; events are always lived and interpreted from some conceptual, bio-
graphical, cultural, ethical, and also philosophical background; actions 
answer to some motivation, etc.
No relativistic or idealist assumption is implied in recognizing that 
subjectivity shapes our experience of the world, but it would also be mis-
leading to speak of all those dimensions as ‘objective’ in the naturalistic 
sense. They reveal the subject of experience, who is no less real than the 
world and is also required for the world to disclose its meaning. Husserl 
spoke of a “personalistic attitude, the attitude we are always in when we 
live with one another, talk to one another” (Husserl 1989, 192). The per-
sonalistic attitude, in which we recognize other persons, is in a way also 
natural, though not naturalistic, because it does not intend to see the 
world only through the eyes of the natural sciences, such as physics.
Our encounter with the world happens in many different ways but 
there are two particularly active levels: sensitivity and rationality. Both 
are distinguishable dimensions of human consciousness and conform the 
first-person perspective, i.e. how something appears to someone. Apart 
from sensory perception the first level includes emotions, feelings, and 
instincts. These already show a teleological relation to and with the world: 
emotions are answers to a given circumstance, but presuppose a direct-
edness guiding and conditioning that response; feelings are also respons-
es to reality and reveal at the same time the encountered world and how 
it affects the subject’s own condition; instincts involve a first degree of 
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instrumentalization of reality according to some subjective interest. So, 
sensitivity already configures a world of meanings, where passivity and 
activity are deeply interweaved.
This account of sensitivity presents some similarities with the enac-
tive approach to the cognitive sciences (Thompson 2007). Enactivism 
postulates a continuity between life and mind, emphasizing the active 
character of living organisms in the configuration of their environment. 
It characterizes living organisms as sense making. A world of meaning 
begins to exist with life, because things can go either right or wrong for 
a life form, even in the absence of consciousness. The beneficial and the 
harmful are actively defined by the organism relatively to its own surviv-
al, and the same goes for the environment (Umwelt) of an animal. Moreo-
ver, an environment would not exist as such without reference to a living 
system: it is the world (Welt) surrounding (um) an organism. For enactiv-
ism phenomenal or conscious life presents a similar kind of subject-cen-
teredness, characterized by a higher degree of subjective configuration of 
the world. Enactivists rightly call attention to the existence of some kind 
of inwardness even at the most basic levels of life, as well as to the pri-
mordial character of activity. But they also tend to reduce all sense mak-
ing to a more or less complex process of what it calls structural coupling 
between an organism and the environment. It does not regard conscious-
ness as a clear break with more basic phenomena, but only as a more com-
plex manifestation of the same kind of processes that already guide the 
self-organizing of cells.
Enactivism is part of a more general departure from classic cognitiv-
ism and representational theories of the mind that endorses an embod-
ied cognition-extended mind approach to psychological explanation (Ad-
ams and Aizawa 2019). The departure from cognitivism takes on different 
forms, from simply playing down the role of representations in cognition 
to radical forms claiming that the mind is just an adaptation for coping 
with the environment (Hutto and Myin 2012). These radical forms appeal 
to different theoretical resources: dynamical systems theory, the senso-
rimotor theory of perception, or an extended theory of mind. As Adams 
and Aizawa point out, none of them is free of difficulties.
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Dynamical systems theories can explain how some basic stimulus-
driven behaviors, such as feeding, can be performed without mental rep-
resentations. The authors observe, however, that the fact that a Venus 
flytrap can obtain food does not prove that cognition can take place with-
out any mental representation, but rather that “the task of obtaining food 
simply does not require cognition” (Adams and Aizawa 2019, 203). The 
sensorimotor theory of perception is close to enactivism (Noë 2006) and 
claims that action is constitutive of perception. But both ordinary expe-
rience and simple experiments showing that sense perception does not 
disappear in the absence of action or movement, seriously question the 
viability of any radical form of this approach. Few would deny also that 
there is a relation of complementarity between brain processes, the body 
in action and the social environment, but this is hardly evidence that 
such a structured system is the equivalent of a cognitive being, as pro-
posed by theorists of the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 
2008). If cognition is defined by coupling, there would also be cognition 
in a thermostat. In spite of all its shortcomings, however, the approach 
supports the idea that cognition and behavior are not understandable as 
acts of a disembodied and isolated subject, and that it is misguided to 
speak without qualifications of an ‘inner’ mind and an ‘outer’ world. Al-
though its radical claims are theoretically interesting, the approach is at-
tractive because it can assume mild claims that almost nobody would re-
ject (Adams and Aizawa 2019).
This digression about enactivism and the embodied cognition-extend-
ed mind approach proves useful to highlight an important distinction. 
Even though they presuppose the surrounding objects, life and feelings 
are essentially self-centered and configure an environment that is rela-
tive to that center. All their activity tends to conserve, defend and expand 
life. In contrast, although also rooted in a subject, rationality is defined by 
the opposite direction: its purpose is to come to grips with the objective 
truth about reality. It reveals a more intense form of intentional life, and 
also a richer engagement with the world, opening up a whole new level of 
activities for the subject: culture, science, ethical behavior, etc. The world 
is infinitely enlarged by rationality not by reducing anything to a subject’s 
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needs and convenience, but by knowing and acting according to the ob-
jective nature of things. Thanks to reason we exist facing up to the whole 
universe. Josef Pieper expressed this idea by saying that while animals 
have an environment (Umwelt, surrounding world), the human being has 
a world (Welt), meaning the whole of reality (Pieper 1998, 99ff.).
The apparently trivial gain of rationality enables objective knowledge, 
helps redirect potentially negative impulses and urges to more construc-
tive aims, makes ethical behavior, and the ensuing responsibility, pos-
sible, and so on. Although it can be put to serve the subject’s needs, the 
proper horizon of rationality is being in all its universality, moving far be-
yond any approach centered around basic forms of life.
There are therefore a centripetal and a centrifugal intentionality. Al-
though both are present at the level of emotions, where centripetal affec-
tivity co-exists with centrifugal behavior (Fuchs 2020, 22), the distinction 
assumes a higher relevance when contrasting the realm of feelings with 
that of reason. In the former objects largely gravitate around the subject, 
while in the latter the subject expands its range potentially to the whole 
of reality. Reason is directed towards the objective nature and value of 
things, and to others as others; it is not first and foremost concerned with 
how the subject is affected by them. Even the person’s own existence and 
place in the world can only be grasped from the rational perspective, since 
rationality allows to conceptualize a world and recognize something as 
having a meaning. The ability to relate to other persons as autonomous 
agents, possessing their own subjectivity, also goes hand in hand with ra-
tionality, because interpersonal relationships presuppose acknowledg-
ment of the other as a different center of the world, not as existing only 
within my own world (Zahavi 2014). And such an attitude is obviously at 
the core of any ethical behavior as well. However, a certain person-cen-
teredness remains also in centrifugal intentionality proper to rationality, 
because the possibilities of realization for the person increase with it.
Phenomenologically speaking, the disclosure of subjectivity is there-
fore given in a twofold layered reduction. A first layer is what we may call, 
following Francisco Leocata, a ‘vital reduction’, which consists in “letting 
human experiences [vivencias; Erlebnisse in German] come forward in all 
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their breadth, according to the perspective and methodology of each hu-
man science” (Leocata 2010, 164). Here we simply acknowledge experi-
ence as it is given, revealing a subject who engages in the lifeworld with 
other persons in a profuse variety of ways, studied by different human 
sciences (history, psychology, aesthetics, linguistics, etc.). As we have 
seen that lifeworld is already pervaded by subjectivity, and therefore re-
veals and reflects our human experience of the world (Leocata 2010, 17).
Although not always recognized, a second layer lies deeper at the root 
of this vital reduction, informing it from within and conveying it a more 
profound meaning. We do not live like other creatures but transcend the 
immediacy of the lifeworld, asking ourselves about the nature of things 
and about their relative value. This radically novel way to address the 
world is manifested not only in pragmatic behavior, but also and mainly 
in the works of culture, which embody an understanding of nature and 
of ourselves. Without suppressing or ignoring the pragmatic domain and 
our immediate interests, the subjectivity that pervades the human life-
world goes far beyond them, because we exist facing the totality of being. 
The human lifeworld is not simply the natural world, but a cultural and 
social world; both represent two different levels of the same personal life 
having nonetheless a partially independent dynamic. Besides, it can also 
bear signs of our need to transcend it and of a deeper questioning about 
the nature of things. The vital reduction reveals thus at its core what Le-
ocata calls a  ‘personalist reduction’, because our world is the lifeworld 
of a person, facing the totality of being and existing together with other 
persons (Leocata 2007, 167).
It is important to see the vital and the personalist reductions as part of 
one same reduction: our embodied make-up and our social existence bear 
a spiritual and personal meaning. All human sciences assume a world of 
meanings and values that gives sense to their own object. But that world 
is not fully understandable from the perspective of the human sciences 
without philosophical, ethical, and sometimes also theological clarifica-
tions. The aim of the reduction is not to uncover something that would 
exist separately or with complete independence of everyday experience, 
a sort of ego or disembodied subject that would only come to light after 
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removing everything that tends to be confused with it. Husserl acknowl-
edged that his own early analyses tended to present the ‘I’ or ego as “emp-
ty of content”, therefore suggesting that nothing had been won (Crisis 
§43; Husserl 1970, 155). But that would be a caricature of phenomenology. 
There is no split between the person and the lifeworld, and the aim of the 
reduction is to reveal the fullness of experience, going beyond a superfi-
cial look that contents itself with the first appearances. Its purpose is not 
to have us withdraw from ordinary life, but to live in a richer way, aware 
of the deeper layers of existence.
Conclusive remarks
It would be interesting to contrast the present proposal of paying atten-
tion to phenomenology in our understanding of the person with William 
Stern’s critical personalism (Stern 2010; Lamiell 2003; Lehmann-Muri-
ithi et al. 2016). Stern stands between what he calls a naïve personalism, 
which places an independent I as the source of unity in the person, and 
impersonalism, which treats the person as a thing, a by-product of mech-
anisms. His understanding of the person as a unitas multiplex integrating 
different kinds of teleologies is a very fruitful notion. Discursive psychol-
ogy, based on Wittgensteinian semantics, is also another recent trend in 
psychology that attempts to do justice to a larger picture of the human 
being (Harré 1998). In all three cases, what is at stake is the capacity to 
provide a framework that integrates various methodologies and confers 
a comprehensive and coherent understanding of all aspects of person-
hood: biological, mental, cultural, ethical, religious, etc.
I have used the term ‘person’ somewhat loosely in the previous pages. 
I am aware that just as on almost anything, there is hardly any agreement 
in philosophy on what a person is. And the same may apply to psychologi-
cal science. Without pretending to settle any discussion, however, I would 
like to propose five statements that characterize a personalist approach 
as I see it:
 a. A person is an individual subject of experience and agency, i.e., of 
passivity and activity.
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 b. The body essentially qualifies the person’s life, providing the means 
for the person’s being-in-the-world and a  fundamental source of 
growth and development.
 c. Rationality is also essential to persons, opening them to truth, cul-
ture, and values.
 d. Both embodied nature and rationality make the person’s social be-
ing possible.
 e. A person’s full flourishing requires relatedness to other persons, so 
that a totally isolated person would be impossible to conceive.
Even though these claims go beyond a mere phenomenology of the 
person, they are grounded in a phenomenological reading of human ex-
istence (Zahavi 2003).
To some the claim that the person is at the core of psychological re-
search may sound outlandish. Maybe the mind or the self, but ‘person’ 
looks too theoretical a notion. To others, on the contrary, it may sound 
like a platitude. What else would psychology deal with? Nonetheless, the 
repeated attempts to interpret the human psyche as a result of biochemi-
cal or sociocultural processes, and the complexity of human experience 
and behavior, suggest that it is anything but trivial to revise once and 
again the philosophical framework from which we interpret the results 
of psychological research. Besides, systematically confronting the results 
of research with philosophical knowledge contributes to a greater aware-
ness of some presuppositions in psychological theory that may otherwise 
not easily come to light. That framework is also reflected in the method-
ology employed and influences both research and theory.
My contribution neither intended to propose a specific methodology 
nor another psychological theory or model. I wanted to suggest, first, that 
the different methodological approaches make more sense if interpreted 
from an un-prejudiced philosophy of the human person. Second, that the 
concept of person can serve as an anchor for different levels of informa-
tion and meaning – physiological, behavioral, phenomenal, cultural, so-
cial, ethical, etc.– and possibly also help achieve an integration of those 
levels. With the metaphor of an anchor, I mean a central core that keeps 
a plurality of dimensions bound together in such a way that these not 
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only qualify that same central core but are also united and integrated 
among themselves. The import of each dimension and their relative value 
derive from their affecting the lifeworld of a person. The phenomenologi-
cal reduction has led to the discovery of a core irreducible to any single 
dimension, but at the same time able to integrate them all.
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